In consultation with others, the IMF has developed standards or codes of good practices in its main areas of responsibility: the Special Data Dissemination Standard; the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency; the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies; and guidelines concerning financial sector soundness see below. Other standard-setting bodies are working on developing, strengthening, and disseminating international standards in the areas of accounting and auditing, bankruptcy, corporate governance, securities market regulation, and social policy.
Banks and other financial institutions need to improve internal practices, including risk assessment and management, and the official sector needs to upgrade supervision and regulation of the financial sector to keep pace with the modern global economy. A pilot program of FSAPs for 12 countries is almost complete. A further 24 FSAPs are planned for the coming year.
WEA eBook Library
Better involvement of the private sector in crisis prevention and resolution can limit moral hazard, strengthen market discipline by fostering better risk assessment, and improve the prospects for both debtors and creditors. Efforts at prevention must be focussed on the implementation of appropriate policies, strengthening of financial systems, and establishing a constructive dialogue with private creditors. The Fund is encouraging members during periods of relative calm to put in place mechanisms that could help facilitate the orderly resolution of crises, including collective action clauses in contracts and contingent lines of credit.
When crises inevitably occur, it is important to maintain the involvement of private creditors. In some cases, it may be possible to rely on the catalytic impact of lending by the Fund or other official sources to persuade creditors to maintain exposure. Argentina, for example, is not an especially small open economy. But it has had a currency board since that has been largely successful in the face of severe challenges. The government announced in January that it was considering abandoning the peso altogether in favor of official adoption of the U.
First and foremost to be added to the list of criteria for a rigid peg is a strong need to import monetary stability due to either a history of hyperinflation, an absence of credible public institutions, or unusually large exposure to nervous investors. The willingness of Argentina to give up monetary independence derives from its past history of hyperinflation and a domestic political consensus that the experience must not be repeated.
It is also useful for a fixed-exchange-rate candidate to have extensive integration with one particular large trading partner or currency area, or a craving for future integration of this sort.
The appropriateness of currency boards in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, for example, derives from their desire for integration with the European Union. The next requirements are access to an adequate level of reserves, and a strong, well-supervised and regulated financial system. Otherwise, the country might simply convert currency-crisis vulnerability into banking-crisis vulnerability. Finally, the existence of the rule of law is a necessary condition for a currency board, though not necessarily for dollarization.
Otherwise, putting the currency peg in the law accomplishes little. Proclaiming a currency board does not, as is sometimes asserted, automatically guarantee the credibility of a fixed-rate peg see Figure 1 ; a currency board is not credibility in a bottle. It is unlikely to be successful unless accompanied by solid fundamentals. Fixing is not the right course for all countries. To begin with the opposite extreme, the United States meets the criterion for an independent, free-floating currency.
- GUANGZHOU INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CITY BANK;
- Search form.
- Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System;
- Environmental Health in Central and Eastern Europe.
We have a large economy. The states of the union are more highly integrated with each other than they are with the rest of the world. There is more movement of trade, labor, and fiscal transfers—and a higher correlation of the business cycle—within our borders than across our borders.
Fluctuations in the exchange rate are simply not as important to us as they are to most countries. We do not want to subordinate our monetary policy to conditions abroad. Thus, the advantages of floating overwhelm the advantages of fixing.
Factsheet - Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System
This does not mean that the U. An occasional purchase or sale of foreign exchange is appropriate, if necessary to maintain in the marketplace a sense of two-way risk rates can go up as easily as down , or to nudge the dollar exchange rate on those few occasions when it is far out of line. Purely parenthetically, the question has arisen of what U.
One cannot resist putting forward the alliterative theory of the dollar Figure 2. What of the new EMU? The eleven members do not satisfy the classic criteria for an OCA as well as the fifty American states do.
- woods bagot: guangzhou international finance center.
- OMA wins competition to design the international financial exchange center in shenzhen!
- The Bretton Woods Era.
- Doubt, time and violence in philosophical and cultural thought : Sino-Western interpretations and analysis.
- Competition Sponsors;
And still less do the other four members of the European Union who have not yet decided whether to join. Labor mobility, income correlations, and federal fiscal cushions are all lower than within the United States. Nevertheless, trade integration and labor mobility within Europe are increasing over time, and as they do, the correlation of national business cycles can be expected to increase as well.
Thus, European countries will, with the passage of time, come increasingly to satisfy the criteria for a common currency. But the theory of the optimum currency area suggests that the euro, dollar and yen should continue in the future to float freely against each other. Most countries are somewhere in between the big United States and little Luxembourg.
Until recently, many experts believed that countries intermediate with respect to size, openness, and the other optimum currency area criteria were probably suited to intermediate exchange-rate regimes. However, suddenly the view has become common that such regimes are not sustainable in a world of large-scale financial flows and, therefore, countries are being pushed to the corners of either firm-fixing or free-floating. What is the logic behind the proposition that countries must choose between firm-fixing and free-floating?
At first glance, it appears to be a corollary to the principle of the impossible trinity.
That principle says that a country must give up one of three goals: exchange-rate stability, monetary independence, or financial-market integration. It cannot have all three simultaneously Figure 3. One can attain any pair of attributes—the first two at the apex marked capital controls , the second two at the point marked monetary union , or the other two at the point marked pure float.
But one cannot be on all three sides simultaneously. The general trend of financial integration has pushed most countries toward the lower part of the graph. If one is at the bottom leg of the triangle, the choice is narrowed down to a simple decision regarding the degree of exchange-rate flexibility. But even under perfect capital mobility, there is nothing to prevent the country from choosing an intermediate solution between floating and monetary union.
Whence, then, the hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate regime? For dehumidification, AHU units are used by Twin Wheel technology to exchange rates with controlled humidity. A brief video introducing the project of Guangzhou Bank can be found in our Blog section : Video tour through the Guangzhou Bank. Related posts:.
Related Great architects of international finance
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved